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EDUCATIONAL EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS FROM THE 
CHAPTER 13 PLAN: CREATING A “REASONABLY 
NECESSARY” STANDARD 
ABSTRACT 
The current state of bankruptcy law concerning chapter 13 educational 
expense deductions from a debtor’s disposable income is cloudy at best. The 
vague guidelines provided by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code have created 
a system where this issue is analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Bankruptcy 
judges possess great discretion in deciding whether a particular tuition 
deduction is “reasonably necessary,” as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), 
creating inconsistent decisions across jurisdictions. BAPCPA created even 
more chaos in this context, as it split debtors into two groups depending on 
their income and forced judges to use the new “means test” to evaluate certain 
debtors’ tuition claims. This makes it very difficult for debtors and objecting 
creditors to predict whether a tuition deduction will be upheld or shifted to the 
debtor’s disposable income to be paid to creditors. 
Congress expressed a desire for debtors to make lifestyle sacrifices in 
return for the benefits of chapter 13 bankruptcy. In addition, the legislature 
contemplated a definite standard for courts to use in calculating a debtor’s 
disposable income. After more than twenty-five years of bankruptcy litigation 
concerning tuition expense deductions, no such standard has emerged. 
This Comment proposes a new test concerning educational expense 
deductions that heeds more closely to the legislative intent. This new standard 
would cap tuition deductions and require debtors to repay a minimum 
percentage of their debt to unsecured creditors. In addition, debtors would 
have to show one of an exclusive group of compelling circumstances. This new 
test would create a more functional, universal standard for bankruptcy judges 
to apply and would alleviate the inconsistencies that have plagued this area of 
bankruptcy law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are over five million students in grades pre-K–12 who attend private 
school in the United States, accounting for around 10% of all students.1 The 
average cost of tuition at these institutions is over $8,500 per year.2 While the 
general public may consider the families of such students to be without 
financial burden, many individuals and families who file for chapter 13 
bankruptcy have dependents who attend private schools. Understandably, these 
families want their children to continue attending their respective schools. But, 
should these families be allowed to direct a substantial amount of their future 
income towards private school tuition while debts owed to legitimate creditors 
go unpaid? 
Whereas chapter 7 bankruptcy essentially liquidates the debtor’s estate and 
leaves the debtor with no collateral,3 chapter 13 bankruptcy allows consumer 
debtors to retain certain property and earnings. Instead, chapter 13 requires that 
debtors pay off their debts over some future period of time according to a 
court-approved plan.4 This plan must detail exactly how much of the debtor’s 
future disposable income must be paid to creditors.5 However, creditors and 
bankruptcy trustees may object to the confirmation of the plan.6 Creditors and 
trustees often object because the debtor is withholding private school tuition or 
some other educational cost as a monthly expense, rather than including that 
amount in the disposable income to be paid to creditors.7 
Chapter 13 debtors may deduct certain expenses from their disposable 
income to be paid to creditors.8 The Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) evaluates 
these expenses differently, depending on whether the debtor’s monthly income 
 
 1 SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2012-045, THE 
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, at 138 (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf. 
 2 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS)—Percentage of Private Schools that Charged Tuition, Percentage 
of Schools Charging Tuition that Allowed Tuition Reductions, and Average Full Tuition at Each School Level, 
by Selected School Characteristics: 2007–08, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/ 
tables/sass0708_008_s2n.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
 3 See Chapter 7—Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 4 7 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D § 139:13 (2008). 
 5 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2006). 
 6 Id. § 1325(b)(1). 
 7 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 869 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 370 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Ehret, 238 B.R. 85, 86 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 465 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1985). 
 8 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
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is above or below the median income of the state in which the debtor resides.9 
For below-median income debtors, these expenses must be “amounts 
reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the 
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”10 For above-median debtors, 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) sets a ceiling of up to $1,775 per year per child for 
certain tuition costs that may be deducted from a debtor’s disposable income.11 
Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) also qualifies such tuition costs by requiring the 
debtor to show that these costs are “reasonable and necessary.”12 
Courts have consistently struggled to determine the meaning of “reasonably 
necessary” and “reasonable and necessary” in the context of chapter 13 debtors 
seeking to deduct tuition expenses from their disposable income. Currently, no 
definitive standard exists that debtors can look to in their attempts to show that 
tuition expenses are reasonably necessary.13 This determination ends up in the 
sole discretion of the bankruptcy judge presiding over the confirmation 
hearing.14 While one jurisdiction may consider a claim for tuition expenses to 
be “reasonably necessary,” another jurisdiction could declare a substantially 
similar claim of tuition expenses to be abusive.15 Unclear standards of 
allowable tuition expenses create inconsistency across jurisdictions, thereby 
making it difficult for debtors to plan for their and their dependents’ 
educational futures. 
This Comment attempts to reconcile the current inconsistencies and 
difficulties in this area of bankruptcy law by proposing certain changes that 
would give way to a new universal test for courts to use in deciding the 
reasonableness and necessity of an educational expense. Bankruptcy judges 
have considered a number of different individualized factors when faced with 
this issue in the past, and this Comment seeks to narrow those issues to a few 
easily identifiable factors. In addition, this Comment suggests certain statutory 
barriers that would preclude a claim for educational expenses altogether. The 
 
 9 See id. § 1325(b)(3). 
 10 Id. § 1325(b)(2). 
 11 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). As this Comment explains, the statutory ceiling has served more as a 
guideline which courts have routinely ignored, and the question of reasonableness and necessity plays a much 
larger role in the confirmation of a chapter 13 plan than the statutorily prescribed amount. See infra Part I.F. 
 12 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
 13 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[T]he allowance of private school 
tuition as a reasonable and necessary expense is not settled law . . . .”). 
 14 See NORTON, supra note 4, § 151:22. 
 15 See Bankruptcy and Your Child’s Private School Fees, THE ONLINE BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Aug. 18, 
2011), http://onlinebankruptcyblog.com/bankruptcy-law/bankruptcy-private-school-fees/. 
CAPOTOSTO GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/16/2013 2:48 PM 
198 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
resulting test would hold true to the legislative history and policy concerns that 
go along with chapter 13, while also allowing debtors to deduct these expenses 
where a compelling circumstance exists. 
This Comment is organized into five parts. Part I provides a thorough 
examination of the applicable Code sections. It includes not only the text of 
such sections, but also a deeper look into the legislative history behind their 
creation. Part I also explains the major statutory changes created by the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”) and examines the distinction that BAPCPA made between 
chapter 13 debtors with different incomes. In addition, Part I explores the 
applicable IRS Standards and how they relate to educational expense 
deductions. 
Beginning with the earliest case to decide the issue of tuition deductions in 
chapter 13, Part II takes a chronological look at how bankruptcy courts have 
interpreted the applicable Code sections. Important pre-BAPCPA cases 
developed certain tests to resolve this issue, but these tests have changed over 
time. BAPCPA created new standards for courts to grapple with, and Part II 
explains the development of the rubric used by courts to decide if educational 
costs are reasonably necessary. Part II then summarizes the present judicial 
standard. 
Using several case illustrations, Part III discerns the most important factual 
circumstances in cases where a tuition expense is in dispute. Part III is broken 
down into several subparts, each focusing on a factor that courts have 
considered relevant and discussing how that factor has affected the courts’ 
decisions. Part III also analyzes how well these factors adhere to the Code and 
legislative history regarding educational expense deductions in chapter 13. 
Part IV proposes a new evaluative standard that would provide more 
guidance to the courts. This new standard best encompasses the congressional 
intent and purpose of chapter 13, while also balancing the rights of creditors 
and debtors. It is much more workable than the current standard and does away 
with the arbitrariness and inconsistency currently plaguing decisions on this 
issue. Part V summarizes the issue at hand and explains why the proposed 
standard from Part IV would better suit all parties involved in chapter 13 
litigation. 
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I. THE MEANING OF DISPOSABLE INCOME—AN EVOLUTIONARY LOOK AT 
§§ 1325(B) AND 707(B)(2) OF THE CODE 
The crux of the issue of whether a debtor may deduct tuition expenses from 
a chapter 13 plan lies in the Code’s definition of “disposable income.” After 
filing a petition for chapter 13 bankruptcy, a debtor must submit a repayment 
plan16 providing for the submission of as much of the debtor’s future income 
and earnings as the United States trustee deems “necessary for the execution of 
the plan.”17 The court then holds a confirmation hearing, where the trustee or 
any unsecured creditor who has filed a proper proof of claim18 may object to 
the approval of the plan if they believe that the debtor is not contributing all of 
his or her disposable income to the repayment plan.19 The proper determination 
of disposable income is essential because a bankruptcy court may not confirm 
a chapter 13 plan unless that plan “provides that all of the debtor’s projected 
disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period . . . will 
be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.”20 Thus, it 
is extremely important for chapter 13 debtors, trustees, and judges to 
understand how to calculate disposable income. 
BAPCPA changed the standard bankruptcy courts followed when 
determining this amount,21 but only for debtors who have above-median 
income.22 These new guidelines subject above-median debtors to the much 
more complex “means test” of § 707(b)(2), where courts must determine 
whether certain expenses being withheld from the plan are abusive before 
confirming the plan.23 Educational expenses are mentioned in a subsection of 
the means test,24 but as this Comment will explain, this subsection has done 
 
 16 11 U.S.C. § 1321; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b). 
 17 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1). 
 18 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002. 
 19 11 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a), 1325(b)(1). 
 20 Id. § 1325(b)(1). 
 21 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33–34 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006)). 
 22 See id. § 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. at 34 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006)). Chapter 13 
debtors who do not have above-median income are still subject to the language of § 1325(b)(2). See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b)(3); see also CHAPTER 13 STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND CALCULATION OF 
COMMITMENT PERIOD AND DISPOSABLE INCOME, OFFICIAL FORM 22C committee note ¶ A (12/08), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_08_Official/Form_22C_1208_ 
Combined.pdf. 
 23 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). 
 24 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
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little to clear up the issue of tuition deductions from a debtor’s disposable 
income. 
An examination of these Code sections and the legislative history behind 
their creation provides a good starting point for discerning whether an 
educational expense deduction is allowable in a chapter 13 plan. Part I.A lays 
out the plain language of § 1325(b)(2) and how it governed the issue of tuition 
deductions before BAPCPA. Part I.B examines the genesis of BAPCPA and 
the changes it effected. It analyzes BACPA’s legislative history, its newly 
created means test, and the resulting split of debtors into two income groups. 
Part I.C explains how the means test is applied to above-median income 
debtors. Part I.D addresses a language discrepancy between §§ 1325(b)(2) and 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) and how it may affect debtors of different incomes in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Part I.E explores the IRS Standards now used in 
determining an above-median debtor’s disposable income. Finally, Part I.F 
summarizes the current Code sections relating to educational expense 
deductions. 
A. The Language and History of § 1325(b)(2) 
Before BAPCPA, every chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income was 
determined in accordance with the provisions of § 1325, regardless of whether 
the debtor had above- or below-median income.25 Section 1325(b) defines the 
term “disposable income” as “current monthly income received by the 
debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the 
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”26 The 
statute also explicitly lists several allowable deductions from a debtor’s 
disposable income,27 none of which include tuition expenses. Thus, if a pre-
BAPCPA debtor wished to deduct any educational costs from his or her 
chapter 13 disposable income, that debtor had to show28 that such costs were 
“amounts reasonably necessary” for the maintenance or support of the debtor 
 
 25 See 9D AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 3146 (2006). 
 26 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
 27 Id. The statute allows for the deduction of child support payments, foster care payments, disability 
payments for a dependent child, domestic support obligations, certain charitable contributions, and certain 
business expenditures from the debtor’s disposable income. Id. Thus, because none of these statutorily 
allowable deductions include tuition expenses, a judge must determine whether tuition expenses are allowable 
according to the vague language. 
 28 The debtor has the ultimate burden of proof to show the court that such deductions from disposable 
income are indeed “reasonably necessary.” See, e.g., In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001). 
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or the debtor’s dependents.29 Historically, this statutory language left 
bankruptcy courts with very little guidance in determining how to test whether 
certain amounts were “reasonably necessary.” The Code consequently gave 
bankruptcy judges great discretion in answering this question on a case-by-
case basis.30 
In construing ambiguous Code provisions, a proper and necessary step for 
courts to take is to look to the legislative history.31 Section 1325(b) was 
implemented as a part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984.32 The most pertinent change to § 1325 was that it restricted courts 
from confirming a chapter 13 plan unless all of a debtor’s disposable income 
during the applicable period was to be paid to the plan.33 The Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary noted its displeasure with the “vague and uncertain 
standards” previously given concerning the portion of the debt to be repaid by 
the debtor.34 In response, the Committee stated that “it is necessary to have a 
definite standard delineating how much of the debtor’s future income should 
be committed to the plan.”35 However, the Committee simultaneously left the 
formation of such a “definite standard” to the courts, asserting that “[t]he 
courts may be expected to determine norms” for the support of the debtor and 
his family and that “Labor Department cost of living figures may provide some 
help.”36 While Congress expressed its desire for the creation of a definite 
standard delineating the amount of disposable income to be committed to a 
chapter 13 plan, it declined to create such a standard itself. 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary also acknowledged that chapter 13 
relief contemplates a substantial effort by the debtor to pay off his debts, and 
that such an effort “may require some sacrifices by the debtor, and some 
 
 29 This logic still applies to below-median debtors after BAPCPA, as BAPCPA only modified the 
definition of “amounts reasonably necessary” for above-median debtors. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 34 (codified as amended 
at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006)). 
 30 See NORTON, supra note 4, § 151:22. 
 31 See Barstow v. IRS (In re Markair, Inc.), 308 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2002); 1 NORTON, supra note 
4, § 2:22. 
 32 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317(3), 98 
Stat. 333, 356 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006)). 
 33 See NORTON, supra note 4, § 139:12. Some courts have recognized that BAPCPA also made a minor 
change to § 1325(b), noting that after BAPCPA, all disposable income had to be allocated exclusively to 
unsecured creditors, where it previously only had to be allocated to the plan in general. Id. § 151:22. 
 34 S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 21 (1983). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 22. 
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alteration in prepetition consumption levels.”37 Noting the benefits that chapter 
13 provides to the debtor, such as retaining the debtor’s property and avoiding 
most non-dischargeable debts, the Committee on the Judiciary called for the 
debtor to attempt to pay off his or her debt to the best of the debtor’s ability.38 
The Committee stated that the first criterion to be considered when calculating 
the amount of disposable income to be contributed to the plan “must be the 
debtor’s obligations to support himself and his family.”39 Presumably, this is 
why the phrase “reasonably necessary” is applied to the “maintenance or 
support of the debtor” or a dependent, as opposed to applying the reasonably 
necessary standard to the repayment plan itself. The Committee also stated that 
“repayment of debt should take precedence over expenses for non-necessary or 
luxury items.”40 This Comment will focus on the resulting dispute between 
bankruptcy courts over whether private school tuition is a “non-necessary or 
luxury item,” especially where adequate public schooling is available.41 
Section 1325(b)’s legislative background offered some guidance to 
bankruptcy judges as they attempted to develop a test to decide which 
expenses were reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the 
debtor and the debtor’s dependents. However, the “definite standard” Congress 
requested never developed in the context of calculating a chapter 13 debtor’s 
disposable income.42 Instead, judges decided whether tuition expenses were 
reasonably necessary on a case-by-case basis, which led to varying and 
inconsistent decisions across the courts.43 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 21–22. 
 39 Id. at 21. 
 40 Id. (citing In re Stollenwerck, 8 B.R. 297 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981)). 
 41 Compare In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (allowing a tuition deduction 
where, even though public schooling was available, there was compelling testimony that the debtor’s daughter 
could not succeed in that environment), with In re Weiss, 251 B.R. 453, 462 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (denying a 
deduction of private school tuition where there was no persuasive testimony showing that the debtor’s children 
could not attend a nearby public school). 
 42 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 871 (“[T]he allowance of private school tuition as a reasonable and 
necessary expense is not settled law . . . .”). 
 43 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 722 (2011). 
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B. The BAPCPA Amendments and the Introduction of the Means Test 
BAPCPA made several important changes to the Code, altering the way 
certain debtors’ disposable income was calculated.44 These changes included 
new provisions that define “current monthly income”45 and split chapter 13 
debtors into two groups based on how a debtor’s income compares to the 
median income in the state in which the debtor resided.46 For above-median 
income debtors, BAPCPA created a new set of guidelines for acceptable 
deductions from disposable income under § 1325.47 Understanding the reasons 
behind BAPCPA is important to determine how and why it affects tuition 
deductions from disposable income. 
A debtor’s current monthly income is the starting point for properly 
calculating the disposable income to be paid to creditors.48 Although this 
calculation is somewhat tedious,49 it is essentially the debtor’s average monthly 
income recorded in the six months prior to filing for bankruptcy.50 After 
BAPCPA, this calculation has become important because it determines 
whether a chapter 13 debtor is subject to the vague language of § 1325(b) or 
the more detailed specifications of the new “means test” of § 707(b)(2). 
Before BAPCPA, debtors of all incomes could file for chapter 7,51 thus 
allowing high-income debtors to seek an immediate discharge despite having 
the ability to repay their debts with substantial future income.52 Congress felt 
that bankruptcy benches were using too much discretion in deciding whether 
abuse had occurred under § 707(b)(2) and that the new reforms would allow 
creditors to be repaid more substantially by shifting some debtors into chapter 
 
 44 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33–34 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006)); AM. JUR. 2D, supra 
note 25, § 3146. 
 45 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2006); see also OFFICIAL FORM 22C (12/08), supra note 22, committee 
note ¶ B. 
 46 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. at 34 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006)). 
 47 See id. 
 48 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2); OFFICIAL FORM 22C (12/08), supra note 22, committee note ¶ A. 
 49 See CHAPTER 13 STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND CALCULATION OF COMMITMENT 
PERIOD AND DISPOSABLE INCOME, OFFICIAL FORM 22C (12/10), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Forms%201210/B_22C_1210.pdf. 
 50 OFFICIAL FORM 22C (12/08), supra note 22, committee note ¶ B.  
 51 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), YOURLEGALGUIDE.COM, 
http://www.yourlegalguide.com/bapcpa/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (“Prior to the BAPCPA, there was no 
Chapter 7 ‘means test’ and debtors could file Chapter 7, 11 or 13 at their option.”). 
 52 Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 233 (2005). 
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13 bankruptcy.53 These congressional themes of restricting judicial discretion 
and increasing debtors’ payments to creditors led to the creation of the new 
§ 707(b)(2), commonly referred to as the “means test.” 
The primary purpose of the BAPCPA means test was to give bankruptcy 
courts a tool to measure whether a chapter 7 debtor seeking liquidation could 
actually repay a portion of his or her debt, and if so, to steer that debtor away 
from chapter 7 and into chapter 13.54 However, the means test also functions in 
a chapter 13 context. The means test essentially computes the disposable 
income that an above-median income debtor would be required to pay under 
§ 1325(b).55 If a debtor’s current monthly income56 is greater than the median 
income of the state in which the debtor resides, then that debtor is subject to 
the means test in determining which costs can be deducted.57 As the Supreme 
Court recently stated, the means test was created to replace “the pre-BAPCPA 
practice of calculating debtors’ reasonable expenses on a case-by-case basis, 
which led to varying and often inconsistent determinations.”58 Curiously, the 
addition of the means test did not change the calculation of a below-median 
income debtor’s disposable income, as those debtors are still subject to the 
language of § 1325(b)(2).59 
In the chapter 13 context, the means test now governs debtors whose 
income is above the median in the state where they reside. The guidelines for a 
court to follow in determining the question of tuition expense deductions by an 
above-median debtor are now distinct from those governing below-median 
debtors. Consequently, it is important to understand exactly how the means test 
is applied to above-median debtors. 
C. Applying the Means Test to Above-Median Income Debtors 
The Code, citing its own provisions, takes above-median income chapter 
13 debtors on a proverbial wild goose chase through the statutes to determine 
the proper monthly expenses to be deducted from disposable income. The 
enactment of BAPCPA changed § 1325 by channeling above-median income 
 
 53 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 51 (2005). 
 54 See 151 CONG. REC. S1856 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley). 
 55 Wedoff, supra note 52, at 240.  
 56 Current monthly income is calculated using OFFICIAL FORM 22C (12/10), supra note 49.  
 57 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006); AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, § 3146. 
 58 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 722 (2011). 
 59 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3); see also supra Part I.A. 
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debtors to the new means test.60 The “amounts reasonably necessary to be 
expended” for above-median-income debtors and their dependents are now 
“determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 
707(b)(2).”61 In addition, above-median debtors now have a maximum 
“applicable commitment period” of five years, compared to only three years 
for below-median debtors.62 For above-median debtors to properly claim that 
their respective tuition expenses are reasonably necessary for the maintenance 
or support of themselves or their dependents, they must now show that such 
expenses are in accordance with the provisions of the new § 707(b)(2).63 
Section 707(b)(2) defines a debtor’s monthly expenses by the “amounts 
specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s 
actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary 
Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the 
debtor resides . . . for the debtor [and] the dependents of the debtor.”64 Thus, 
above-median debtors have a great deal of material to look to when discerning 
whether their claimed educational expenses are valid deductions from their 
disposable income. 
In discerning whether certain tuition deductions are allowable under the 
means test, the first and most logical place to look is the statute itself. The 
BAPCPA amendments included the addition of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), which 
directly addresses tuition costs.65 Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) originally 
allowed for the actual expenses of private elementary or secondary school 
tuition—up to $1,500 per year per child—to be deducted from the debtor’s 
disposable income to be paid to creditors.66 The statutorily allowable number 
now stands at $1,775 per year per child,67 and that amount is subject to 
adjustment every three years by the Judicial Conference of the United States.68 
While the reasons for this addition are unclear, courts have noted that, “[f]or 
some purposes at least, Congress has set forth the public policy that private 
 
 60 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 102(h)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 33–34 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006)). 
 61 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3). 
 62 Id. § 1325(b)(4)(A). The applicable commitment period represents the length of time a chapter 13 
debtor must commit to, or live under, the approved plan. See id. § 1325(b)(1)(B). 
 63 See AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 25, § 3146. 
 64 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). For a more in-depth analysis of these IRS Standards, see infra Part I.E. 
 65 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 102(a)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 28 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006)). 
 66 Id. 
 67 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (West 2010). 
 68 11 U.S.C. § 104. 
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school tuition can be a reasonable and necessary expense.”69 However, this 
tuition amount is vastly below the actual costs of private schooling in the 
United States,70 so it is curious that Congress would choose such an amount. 
Senator Chris Dodd expressed this feeling when he proposed an 
amendment to the BAPCPA means test to allow for educational expenses.71 He 
noted that not only was $1,500 insufficient to pay for “some fancy prep school 
or boarding school,” but that amount would not even cover the cost of “a basic 
parochial school education.”72 Thus, whatever purpose Congress was 
contemplating when it added § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), the shockingly low tuition 
amount that the provision allows suggests either that Congress did not perform 
due diligence in researching how much private schooling costs or that 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) is not meant to cover such costs in their entirety.73 
Consequently, many courts have avoided the prescribed amount in 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) altogether, as tuition deductions far exceeding the 
statutory amount have been considered reasonably necessary to the 
maintenance or support of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents.74 
Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) only allows expenses for elementary and 
secondary schools and only applies to dependents under eighteen.75 
Accordingly, it has been read to exclude all college expenses.76 In a recent 
decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana stated: 
Applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), the omission from that subsection of college 
education expenses for children over 18 years of age suggests an 
exclusion, makes sense as a matter of legislative purpose, and does 
not produce a result contrary to the statute’s purpose. If Congress had 
wished to include college expenses for children over 18 years of age 
 
 69 In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 373 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006). 
 70 See 151 CONG. REC. S2224 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd). 
 71 See id. at S2223–24. 
 72 Id. at S2224. 
 73 Unfortunately, commentary as to the origin of this statutory tuition amount is quite scarce. Given the 
purpose of chapter 13, however, it seems that the latter is more likely. 
 74 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Urquhart, No. 09-71058, 
2009 WL 3785573, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2009); In re Cleary, 357 B.R. at 374. 
 75 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006). 
 76 See, e.g., In re Featherston, Nos. 07-60296-13, 07-60441-13, 2007 WL 2898705, at *12 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Featherston v. Drummond (In re Featherston), No. CV 08-16-GF-SHE, 
2008 WL 5217936 (D. Mont. Dec. 11, 2008). 
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in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), it could have drafted that subsection 
accordingly.77 
Bankruptcy courts have followed this reasoning even after the enactment of 
BAPCPA, holding that college tuition expenses are not reasonably necessary in 
a variety of chapter 13 cases.78 Thus, in post-BAPCPA cases, only elementary 
and secondary school tuition expense deductions have a chance of being 
considered reasonably necessary and surviving a court’s review or 
confirmation hearing. 
Unfortunately, § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) negates whatever stability it could 
bring by requiring the debtor to provide “a detailed explanation of why such 
expenses are reasonable and necessary, and why such expenses are not already 
accounted for in the National Standards, Local Standards, or Other Necessary 
Expenses.”79 This language raises two important issues: (1) how the phrase 
“reasonable and necessary” of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) relates to the “reasonably 
necessary” language of § 1325(b)(2); and (2) what exactly is included in the 
IRS Standards. 
D. “Reasonable and Necessary” vs. “Reasonably Necessary” 
The discrepancy in statutory language between §§ 1325(b)(2) and 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV)80 is notable because judges must apply different language 
to debtors depending on the debtors’ income. The phrase “disposable income,” 
as used in § 1325(b), is the “current monthly income received by the 
debtor . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the 
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”81 Thus, the 
phrase “reasonably necessary” applies to the needs of the debtor and the 
debtor’s family, rather than to the debtor’s general plan. Presumptively, the 
“maintenance or support” of each distinct debtor or debtor’s dependent varies 
widely, and courts and legislators alike have struggled to set uniform standards 
 
 77 Id. at *15. 
 78 See, e.g., In re Saffrin, 380 B.R. 191, 193–94 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Goins, 372 B.R. 824, 827 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2007); DeHart v. Boyd (In re Boyd), 378 B.R. 81, 83–84 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 79 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
 80 Section 1325(b)(2) requires deducted expenses to be “reasonably necessary,” whereas 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) requires a debtor to show why deducted tuition expenses are “reasonable and 
necessary.” Compare id. § 1325(b)(2), with id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV).  
 81 Id. § 1325(b)(2).  
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as to what costs are reasonably necessary to maintain and support a typical 
debtor’s family.82 
For above-median debtors, the statutory language becomes even more 
confusing because the phrase “amounts reasonably necessary” is further 
defined by § 707(b)(2).83 In the context of school tuition, 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) states that, despite the statutorily-provided amount of 
$1,775 per year per child, the debtor must also provide a “detailed explanation 
of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary” and why such costs are 
not covered by the IRS Standards.84 Not only does an above-median income 
debtor have to show that the tuition costs claimed are “reasonable and 
necessary,” but the debtor must also show that those reasonable and necessary 
costs are “reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support” of the debtor 
and the debtor’s dependents. This additional requirement adds much confusion 
to what an above-median income debtor must show to meet the burden of 
proof. Because of the lack of precision in the statutory language, courts have 
taken it upon themselves to create their own tests to determine what constitutes 
a “reasonably necessary” deduction of educational expenses.85 
E. The IRS Standards 
The IRS Standards define what monthly expenses may be deducted from 
above-median income debtors’ disposable income.86 Section 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) states, “The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s 
applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards 
and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the 
categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides.”87 This section 
provides additional clarity and structure to the calculation of a debtor’s 
expenses in the areas specifically addressed by the IRS and the statute itself, 
such as housing, food, and healthcare costs.88 However, a thorough 
examination of the IRS Standards referred to by § 707(b)(2) yields no usable 
 
 82 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[T]he allowance of private school 
tuition as a reasonable and necessary expense is not settled law . . . .”). 
 83 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3). 
 84 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (emphasis added).  
 85 See infra Part II. 
 86 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id.; IRM 5.15.1.7 (Oct. 2, 2009). 
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standard when it comes to the majority of chapter 13 educational cost 
deductions. 
The IRS National Standards account for “Food, Clothing and Other Items” 
and “Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenses.”89 The “Food, Clothing and Other 
Items” category allows “reasonable amounts” for five types of expenses: 
“food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care products and 
services, and miscellaneous.”90 While these five categories are all distinct, the 
IRS combines all of the amounts into “one total national standard expense,”91 
which is a fixed dollar amount based on household size and income, derived 
annually from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey.92 
The “Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenses” category predictably establishes a 
similar standard for out-of-pocket health costs and accounts for expenses such 
as prescription drugs and contact lenses.93 Allowances for out-of-pocket 
healthcare expenses are based on data from the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey.94 The IRS provides one “Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenses” 
amount for its National Standards and allows for these monthly expenses per 
se, without questioning the amount a debtor actually spends.95 
While it is fairly obvious that tuition costs would not fall under any of the 
above-listed categories, one may wonder if educational expenses may be 
covered under the “miscellaneous” expenses addressed in the “Food, Clothing 
and Other Items” category. The IRS defines the “miscellaneous” category 
simply as “a percentage of the other categories . . . based on BLS data,” but 
gives no further explanation as to what types of monthly expenses it is meant 
to cover.96 This subcategory essentially amounts to a small additional stipend 
given by the IRS, and the issue of whether educational expenses are included 
in this subcategory has yet to be discussed in a relevant bankruptcy proceeding. 
The Local Standards given by the IRS also list two categories of necessary 
expenses: “Housing and Utilities” and “Transportation.”97 The “Housing and 
Utilities” category establishes a localized expense standard for each county in 
 
 89 IRM 5.15.1.7(3). 
 90 Id. 5.15.1.7(3)(A). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 5.15.1.7(3)(B). It is worth noting, however, that “elective procedures,” such as plastic surgery, are 
generally not covered under “Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenses.” Id. 5.15.1.8(5). 
 94 Id. 5.15.1.7(3)(B). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 5.15.1.8(1)(E). The acronym “BLS” refers to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 97 Id. 5.15.1.9(1). 
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each state, and the prescribed amount is derived from both Census and Bureau 
of Labor Statistics data.98 The “Transportation” category covers loan or lease 
payments and operating costs for debtors who own a vehicle, while also 
providing one nationwide allowance for those without a vehicle.99 However, 
neither category addresses the educational costs of a debtor or a debtor’s 
dependents. 
The only other way for a debtor to account for tuition expenses would be 
under the “Other Necessary Expenses” category of the IRS Standards.100 For 
an expense to qualify under this standard, it must meet the “necessary expense 
test” by either providing “for the health and welfare of the taxpayer and/or his 
or her family”101 or “for the production of income.”102 The “Other Necessary 
Expenses” category is the only one of the three IRS Standards given in 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) that explicitly refers to educational expenses.103 In a table 
laying out examples of expenses that may qualify under this category, the IRS 
states that an educational expense may be necessary “[i]f it is required for a 
physically or mentally challenged child and no public education providing 
similar services is available” or if such an expense is “required as a condition 
of employment.”104 While the Internal Revenue Manual provides these helpful 
explanatory guidelines, they are by no means binding on bankruptcy courts.105 
The IRS explicitly states that such a determination depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.106 As a result, debtors attempting to claim 
educational expenses that are not required by their jobs or related to a child’s 
disabilities are still left in the dark and lack any standards on which to base 
their arguments. 
Thus, even after examining the IRS Standards, courts are still left with a 
fact-based question of reasonableness and necessity, which is basically what 
 
 98 Id. 5.15.1.7(4)(A). The “Housing and Utilities” category includes “mortgage (including interest) or 
rent, property taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs, gas, electric, water, heating oil, garbage collection, 
telephone and cell phone.” Id. 
 99 Id. 5.15.1.7(4)(B). These costs are derived from standard nationwide loan figures and census data. Id. 
 100 Id. 5.15.1.10. 
 101 Id. 5.15.1.10(1). While the language in the Internal Revenue Manual refers to a “taxpayer,” these 
standards are applied to a debtor when they are referred to in a bankruptcy matter. See DeHart v. Boyd (In re 
Boyd), 378 B.R. 81, 84 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 102 IRM 5.15.1.10(1). 
 103 Compare id. 5.15.1.10(3), with id. 5.15.1.8, and id. 5.15.1.9. 
 104 Id. 5.15.1.10(3). 
 105 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2011). 
 106 IRM 5.15.1.10(1). 
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the means test prescribes in the first place.107 Following the statutes brings a 
debtor and the bankruptcy courts full circle back to a non-uniform, case-by-
case analysis, and the debtor must show that the claimed tuition expenses are 
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor and his or 
her dependents.108 
F. Statutory Summary 
The large amount of information in the Code, BAPCPA, legislative history, 
and IRS Standards can be overwhelming. Below is a succinct summary of the 
calculation of chapter 13 disposable income as it stands today. 
When assessing whether an educational expense deduction will be allowed, 
all chapter 13 debtors must start with § 1325(b)(2), which defines disposable 
income.109 Disposable income is calculated by subtracting “amounts 
reasonably necessary to be expended” from a debtor’s “current monthly 
income.”110 All debtors use the same definition of current monthly income111 
and calculate such income using a standard bankruptcy form.112 Because of 
BAPCPA, however, there are now two different definitions of “amounts 
reasonably necessary to be expended,” the use of which depends on a debtor’s 
income. 
For below-median income debtors, the phrase “amounts reasonably 
necessary to be expended” is defined by the statutory language surrounding 
it.113 Allowable tuition expense deductions must be “amounts reasonably 
necessary to be expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a 
dependent of the debtor.”114 Recall that this determination is a question of fact 
that courts must decide on a case-by-case basis.115 For courts to answer this 
question, they “must become involved in many difficult questions” of the 
debtor’s lifestyle and beliefs.116 
 
 107 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006). 
 108 See id. §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), 1325(b)(3). 
 109 See id. § 1325(b)(2). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See id. § 101(10A). 
 112 See OFFICIAL FORM 22C (12/10), supra note 49. 
 113 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
 114 Id. Recall that there are other statutorily allowable deductions, but they are specific and not tuition-
related. See id. § 1325(b)(2)(A)–(B). Therefore, tuition deductions could only fall under the catchall 
“maintenance or support” phrase. See id. § 1325(b)(2)(A). 
 115 NORTON, supra note 4, § 151:22. 
 116 Id. 
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For above-median income debtors, the definition of “amounts reasonably 
necessary to be expended” is more complicated.117 These debtors must turn to 
the means test of § 707(b)(2).118 Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) explicitly limits 
educational expenses to “private or public elementary or secondary” school 
tuition for “each dependent child less than 18 years of age.”119 Additionally, 
this subsection seemingly sets a ceiling on these tuition expenses at “$1,775 
per year per child.”120 While post-BAPCPA courts have followed the age and 
school requirements of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) by excluding college tuition 
from consideration,121 they have also allowed amounts far exceeding $1,775 
per year per child.122 This practice indicates that bankruptcy judges have 
recognized that such a low statutory amount is unworkable. 
The IRS National Standards, Local Standards, and “Other Necessary 
Expenses” include other deductible expenses for above-median income 
debtors.123 While these standards list a large number of acceptable expenses,124 
the only place where an educational expense deduction may fall is under 
“Other Necessary Expenses,” where such a deduction must pass the “necessary 
expense test.”125 An educational expense passes this test if the tuition “is 
required for a physically or mentally challenged child and no public education 
providing similar services is available” or if the tuition is “required as a 
condition of [the debtor’s] employment.”126 Despite these guidelines, the IRS 
explicitly states that this test is “determined based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.”127 
As a result, debtors and bankruptcy judges are forced to grapple with a fact-
based determination of the reasonableness and necessity of a tuition expense, 
regardless of the debtor’s income. The legislative history of these Code 
 
 117 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3). 
 118 Id. § 1325(b)(3). 
 119 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See, e.g., In re Featherston, Nos. 07-60296-13, 07-60441-13, 2007 WL 2898705, at *14 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Featherston v. Drummond (In re Featherston), No. CV 08-16-GF-SHE, 
2008 WL 5217936 (D. Mont. Dec. 11, 2008). 
 122 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Urquhart, No. 09-71058, 
2009 WL 3785573, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2009); In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 374 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
2006). 
 123 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 124 See generally IRM 5.15.1.7–.10 (Oct. 2, 2009). 
 125 Id. 5.15.1.10(1). 
 126 Id. 5.15.1.10(3). 
 127 Id. 5.15.1.10(1). 
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sections reveals somewhat helpful background information that may help 
courts make this case-by-case determination less arbitrary. 
The legislative history helps to clarify the congressional intent concerning 
chapter 13 disposable income. Congress first contemplated a chapter 13 
bankruptcy that emphasizes sacrifice on the part of the debtor as compared to 
his previous lifestyle and maximum repayment to creditors.128 However, the 
addition of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) to the Code makes it clear that Congress 
wished to include some sort of educational tuition expense deduction. It 
remains unclear under what circumstances a debtor’s deduction of tuition costs 
from disposable income is “reasonably necessary” and how bankruptcy courts 
should make such a determination. As Congress explicitly left the development 
of a definite standard to the courts,129 it is proper to examine the relevant case 
law analyzing educational expense deductions. 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND THE TESTS FOR REASONABLY NECESSARY 
TUITION EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 directed 
the courts to develop a definite standard for delineating the proper amount to 
contribute to a chapter 13 plan.130 Through valid methods of statutory 
interpretation, different jurisdictions have created a variety of tests to decide 
what constitutes a reasonably necessary expense for the maintenance or 
support of a debtor and a debtor’s dependents.131 However, none of these tests 
have caught on with a majority of the jurisdictions, and courts still disagree as 
to what types of educational expenses are “reasonably necessary.”132 
Part II.A explains the decisions by the earliest courts tasked with resolving 
the issue of educational cost deductions in chapter 13 cases, culminating with 
an explanation of a two-prong test that was prevalent just prior to the BAPCPA 
amendments. Part II.B examines two related cases that provide an explanation 
of a balancing test prevalent post-BAPCPA. Additionally, Part II.B analyzes 
how courts use the new means test to resolve an above-median debtor case 
after BAPCPA. Finally, Part II concludes with an attempt to reconcile these 
 
 128 S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 22 (1983). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See infra Parts II.A–B.  
 132 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011). 
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different tests and explains what the current standard of review is concerning 
chapter 13 tuition deductions. 
A. Jones, Watson, and the Pre-BAPCPA Cases 
The Bankruptcy Court of the District of Minnesota was the first bankruptcy 
panel to assess whether private school tuition was “reasonably necessary” 
within the meaning of § 1325(b)(2).133 In In re Jones, an unsecured creditor 
objected to a chapter 13 debtor’s plan because the creditor did not consider the 
listed monthly tuition expenditures of $500 for each of the debtor’s children to 
be reasonably necessary.134 At the time, no cases had analyzed this new 
statutory language, and no standard had yet been created.135 The Jones court 
observed that the legislative history left the development of such a standard up 
to the courts and took it upon itself to create one by employing “other methods 
of construction to determine that meaning.”136 
The Jones court used the age-old canon of in pari materia137 in 
constructing its standard, noting that “if similar terms can be found used to 
similar purpose in the Bankruptcy Code, guidance may be taken from the 
judicial interpretations of those terms.”138 The court then turned to 
§§ 522(d)(10)(E) and 523(a)(2)(C) to find such similar terms.139 Section 
523(a)(2)(C) defined the phrase “luxury goods or services” as “goods or 
services [not] reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor 
or a dependent of the debtor.”140 Thus, the court reasoned that goods and 
services that are reasonably necessary within the meaning of § 1325(b)(2) are 
not “luxury goods and services,” as defined in § 523(a)(2)(C).141 
 
 133 See In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 95 (2012) (“It is a basic canon of statutory construction that statutes in 
pari materia should be construed together so that all parts of the statutory scheme are given effect. Two statutes 
are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons 
or things, or have the same purpose or object.” (footnote omitted)). 
 138 In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 465–66.  
 139 Id. at 466. 
 140 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II, Vol. I 1983–1985)). That section of the Code has since 
been modified. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
 141 In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 466.  
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Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempted certain payments “to the extent reasonably 
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.”142 
Another bankruptcy court had previously interpreted this section in In re 
Taff,143 a decision to which the Jones court turned to further clarify its new 
standard.144 The Taff court had decided that the reasonably necessary amount 
to be set aside for a debtor “ought to be sufficient to sustain basic needs, not 
related to [the debtor’s] former status in society or the lifestyle to which he is 
accustomed.”145 Because the Jones court considered § 522(d)(10)(E) to be 
substantially similar to § 1325(b)(2)(A) in that both sections provide the debtor 
with some retention amount to support the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, 
it adopted the Taff standard and applied it to the Jones case.146 
The Jones court concluded that the monthly expenditures of $500 for each 
of the debtor’s children were not reasonably necessary because the court did 
not consider private school education to be a “basic need.”147 This “basic 
needs” test set the precedent for later courts to follow. It is considered a fairly 
strict approach, however, and many courts have declined to follow it, 
developing their own distinct tests instead.148 Nonetheless, the basic needs test 
appears to adhere to the original purpose of chapter 13 bankruptcy, which 
requires a substantial effort by the debtor to repay as much debt as possible and 
may require some sacrifices on the part of the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents.149 
After the Jones decision, bankruptcy courts took a wide range of stances on 
what constituted a reasonably necessary tuition expense. For example, the 
court in In re Gonzales tempered Jones’s basic needs test, stating that 
“Congress did not direct that to qualify for chapter 13 relief a debtor must take 
a vow of three years of monastic existence. Instead, Congress demanded only 
‘some sacrifices . . . and some alteration in prepetition consumption levels.’”150 
The Gonzales court found that tuition costs of $700 for two dependent college 
 
 142 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982)). 
 143 See generally Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 B.R. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). 
 144 In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 466. 
 145 In re Taff, 10 B.R. at 107. 
 146 In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 466. 
 147 Id. at 467. 
 148 See, e.g., Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 660–61 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), aff’d, 403 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011). 
 149 S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 22 (1983). 
 150 In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604, 611 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 22). 
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students were a reasonably necessary expense.151 Conversely, some bankruptcy 
panels followed the precedent set in Jones, rejecting the premise that private 
school tuition is a basic need in most circumstances.152 
In In re Watson, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit 
delineated a “totality of the circumstances” test, which summarized the 
standard for determining reasonably necessary tuition expenses immediately 
preceding BAPCPA.153 The panel first noted that, standing alone, private 
school tuition is not a reasonably necessary expense.154 However, the panel 
held that such expenses could be considered reasonably necessary if a 
compelling circumstance existed or if the debtor had “compensated for such an 
expense by eliminating other reasonably necessary expenses.”155 The panel 
suggested that other courts should “examine the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether the debtor’s plan reflects a good faith effort to maximize 
repayment to creditors.”156 
The Watson court laid out a two-prong test for future bankruptcy courts to 
follow. First, a court must consider the debtor’s reasoning for private 
schooling, “examining the adequacy of the public school alternative as a 
general matter and with respect to the particular educational needs of the 
student in question.”157 In Watson, the debtors failed to demonstrate that the 
tuition costs deducted from disposable income ($735 per month for two 
children to attend private school) met this standard, as the debtors’ only 
reasoning was a preference for private schooling based on the family’s 
religious beliefs.158 
Second, if a debtor fails to demonstrate compelling circumstances, then the 
court must examine the proposed plan to see if the debtor has compensated for 
the tuition costs by contributing other reasonably necessary expenses to the 
plan.159 In this second prong, courts analyze “the expense of private school 
tuition relative to the debtor’s other expenses, the debtor’s total debt 
 
 151 Id. 
 152 See, e.g., Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 
 153 See In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 660–61. This case was decided just one year before the BAPCPA 
amendments were enacted. 
 154 In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 660 (citing In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001); 
Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd., 204 B.R. 497). 
 155 Id. at 660–61.  
 156 Id. at 660 (citing In re Webb, 262 B.R. at 690; Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd., 204 B.R. 497). 
 157 Id. at 661. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 660–61. 
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obligations under the plan, and the distribution creditors would receive.”160 
This second prong is rooted in the good faith requirement of chapter 13,161 
calling for a substantial effort by the debtor to repay his debts.162 
If a debtor fails both parts of the totality of the circumstances test, then the 
tuition is not reasonably necessary, and the plan cannot be confirmed.163 This 
result is precisely what occurred in Watson, as the debtor did not offset the 
tuition costs by eliminating other necessary expenses and the plan only 
proposed to pay back 25% of the debt owed to creditors.164 The totality of the 
circumstances test encompasses the legislative intent concerning disposable 
income in chapter 13 plans, while balancing the needs of both debtors and 
creditors. This Comment uses the precedent set by Watson as a basis for 
developing a new standard for discerning what educational deductions are 
reasonably necessary. 
The case law concerning chapter 13 educational expense deductions before 
BAPCPA shows that courts were inconsistent in their approaches to 
determining reasonably necessary education costs. This inconsistency created a 
system that allowed for great judicial discretion and forced courts to immerse 
themselves in the facts surrounding each particular case.165 While the 
BAPCPA amendments were supposed to do away with these issues, the 
relevant case law shows that BAPCPA did little to resolve these problems. 
B. Cleary/Crim Balancing and the Post-BAPCPA Cases 
One of the most important changes made by BAPCPA was the split it 
created between above- and below-median income debtors. This split certainly 
required a change in the way courts evaluated tuition deductions for above-
median debtors, but courts were still unclear as to what test to use for below-
median debtors. This section discusses both situations by examining the 
reasoning used by bankruptcy courts in three major post-BAPCPA decisions: 
(1) In re Cleary; (2) In re Crim; and (3) In re Boyd. 
 
 160 Id. at 661. 
 161 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006). 
 162 See In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 660 (citing In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001); 
Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497 (E.D. Tex. 1996)). 
 163 Id. at 661–62. 
 164 Id.  
 165 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 722 (2011). 
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1. Cleary and Below-Median Debtors 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina decided Cleary 
just one year after the enactment of BAPCPA, and the court’s opinion in that 
case elaborated on the issue of reasonably necessary tuition deductions.166 The 
case dealt with a below-median debtor who tried to claim a monthly parochial 
school tuition expense of $1,513 for his six children.167 The court held that, for 
below-median debtors, the question of whether tuition is a reasonably 
necessary expense must be determined in the context of the debtor’s estimated 
monthly expenses.168 The court went on to provide that “[t]hese expenses must 
undergo judicial analysis, in the face of an objection, as to reasonableness and 
necessity; or as some might say, ‘the old fashion way.’”169 Essentially, the 
court applied the same pre-BAPCPA standard of judicial discretion and 
analysis to a below-median debtor after BAPCPA. 
The Cleary court swept aside the public policy notion that private school 
tuition is always a “luxury expense” due to Congress’s inclusion of 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV).170 The court also noted the pre-BAPCPA split among 
courts on the subject of private school tuition as a deduction from disposable 
income.171 The court stated that those earlier cases had balanced “creditor’s 
rights against the appropriate basic needs of the debtors and their 
dependents.”172 With this balancing test in mind, the Cleary court examined 
the facts of the case as a whole, assessing the reasonableness and necessity of 
the tuition deduction in light of the particular circumstances.173 On one side of 
the fulcrum, the court noted that the debtor was retaining his real estate in 
chapter 13, paying only a 1% dividend to unsecured creditors, and that the 
debtor’s children had no special educational needs.174 Despite these 
circumstances, the court found the tuition deduction to be reasonably necessary 
based on other factors.175 The court asserted that the children’s long-term 
enrollment in parochial schools and the family’s deeply held religious 
 
 166 In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 370 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006). 
 167 Id. at 370–71. 
 168 Id. at 372. 
 169 Id. at 372–73. 
 170 Id. at 373. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. (quoting Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 403 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2005)). 
 173 See id. at 373–74. 
 174 Id. at 373. 
 175 See id. 
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convictions weighed in favor of the debtor.176 The deciding factor, however, 
was the family’s sacrifice of other basic expenses.177 
The Cleary court also addressed whether a below-median debtor is limited 
by the private school tuition expense ceiling, which, according to the court, is a 
presumptively reasonable limit for above-median debtors.178 The court ruled 
that this limit does not apply,179 but for a different reason than expected. Rather 
than simply noting that § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) does not apply to below-median 
debtors, the court stated that its decision was “limited very narrowly to the 
facts of this case,” specifically citing the lifestyle choices and sacrifices made 
by the debtor and his family.180 This case clearly demonstrates the immense 
discretion bankruptcy judges continued to possess after BAPCPA in deciding 
whether tuition costs are reasonably necessary. 
2. Crim, Boyd, and Above-Median Debtors 
Following in the footsteps of Cleary, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle 
District of Tennessee used a balancing test in Crim.181 In Crim, the above-
median debtors attempted to modify their plan to deduct $500 per month for 
tuition to allow their dependent, chronically ill daughter to attend private 
school.182 The fact that this court was evaluating a modified plan is 
noteworthy.183 Section 1329 gives the criteria for the approval of a proposed 
plan modification and states that “[s]ections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of 
this title and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title apply to any 
modification.”184 The court noted that § 1329 does not incorporate § 1325(b) of 
the Code, and therefore, the disposable income requirements of § 1325(b) and 
§ 707(b)(2) did not apply.185 Thus, rather than evaluating the tuition expense 
claim using the means test, the court looked to the debtor’s actual income and 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 374. These sacrifices included giving up food, transportation, clothing and recreational costs; 
opting for chapter 13 repayment instead of chapter 7 liquidation; giving up furniture secured by purchase-
money loans; and the fact that Mrs. Cleary’s paycheck was reduced in order to pay for her children’s tuition. 
Id. 
 178 Id. at 373–74. 
 179 Id. at 374 
 180 Id. 
 181 In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871–72 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011). 
 182 Id. at 869–70. 
 183 Id. at 871. 
 184 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1) (2006). 
 185 In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 871. 
CAPOTOSTO GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/16/2013 2:48 PM 
220 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
expenses at the time of the proposed modification to determine whether the 
plan should be adjusted.186 
The Crim court next looked to the Cleary decision, noting the importance 
of the fact that post-BAPCPA law was not settled on whether private school 
tuition is a reasonable and necessary expense.187 The court concluded that the 
balancing test still applied, turning on the “reasonableness and necessity” of 
“sustaining the basic needs of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.”188 
Noting that the debtors had made significant sacrifices in attempting to pay 
back their creditors and that no other public school options were available for 
the debtors’ child, the court found the $500 monthly tuition expense to be 
reasonable and necessary.189 
In an explanatory footnote, the Crim court addressed whether the means 
test applies when evaluating a plan modification.190 The court noted that, while 
the issue is not settled, the disposable income test did not apply in the context 
of this particular case.191 The court continued to explain that even if the means 
test had applied, its decision would have been the same: 
Even if the court is incorrect and these above-median income debtors 
had to satisfy § 707(b)(2) via § 1325(b), the court would find that the 
debtors are entitled to their $500 monthly tuition payments pursuant 
to § 707(b)(2)(A)(II) and (IV) as proven monthly educational 
expenses up to $1,775 per year and all tuition costs above that 
amount approved as actual expenses incurred to care for a chronically 
ill dependent.192 
This explanation shows that even if the means test had applied to the above-
median debtor in this case, the tuition costs would nevertheless be covered in 
part by the $1,775 tuition ceiling of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). Furthermore, the 
difference fell under the scope of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), which allows for 
reasonable and necessary expenses for the care and support of a chronically ill 
dependent.193 That the court applied § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) to tuition expenses 
is creative and shows that the special learning needs of a debtor’s dependent is 
 
 186 Id. (quoting In re Prieto, No. 3:08-bk-3308-PMG, 2010 WL 3959610, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 
22, 2010)). 
 187 Id. (citing In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 371 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006)). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 872. 
 190 See id. at 871 n.1. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006). 
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an important factor for courts to consider in assessing whether a tuition 
expense is reasonable and necessary. 
Boyd is another example of a post-BAPCPA decision involving an above-
median income debtor.194 In Boyd, the court had to decide whether to allow a 
monthly deduction for a college tuition expense of $200 for the debtor’s 
daughter.195 The court first turned to § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) and, using the 
principle of ejusdem generis,196 concluded that the tuition costs were not 
reasonably necessary.197 
Next, the court entertained the possibility that the tuition deduction may 
qualify as an “Other Necessary Expense” under the IRS Standards.198 Looking 
to an example given by the IRS’s Financial Analysis Handbook,199 the court 
concluded that college tuition payments for an adult child were not included in 
the “Other Necessary Expense” category, “except to the extent that the ‘tax’ 
obligation could still be paid within five years.”200 The court then analogized 
the tax obligation to unsecured debt.201 Because the debtor’s plan only 
provided for partial repayment of the unsecured claims, the tuition costs of the 
debtor’s daughter did not qualify under the IRS Standards.202 
In the end, the BAPCPA amendments seem to have done little to affect 
judicial review of tuition deductions from disposable income in chapter 13 
cases.203 Most cases are highly fact-intensive, with courts reviewing the 
circumstances of each particular debtor. The balancing test set forth in Cleary 
and Crim has developed over time, but this test remains vague and lacks 
 
 194 See DeHart v. Boyd (In re Boyd), 378 B.R. 81, 82 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Meaning “of the same kind,” ejusdem generis is a canon of construction that provides that general 
words in a statute should be construed to be similar in scope to any preceding specific words. NORMAN J. 
SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 
2007). 
 197 In re Boyd, 378 B.R. at 83–85 (noting that the debtor’s expenditure was larger than the statutorily 
approved amount, his daughter was an adult, and college is not an elementary or secondary school). 
 198 Id. at 84–85. 
 199 Id. at 84 (quoting IRM 5.15.1-1 (May 1, 2004)). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 83–84. 
 203 What has been settled is that post-secondary tuition expenses are generally not allowable after the 
addition of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). See, e.g., In re Saffrin, 380 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2007); In re Boyd, 378 B.R. at 83–84; In re Featherston, Nos. 07-60296-13, 07-60441-13, 2007 WL 2898705, 
at *12 (Bankr. D. Mont. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Featherston v. Drummond (In re Featherston), No. CV 
08-16-GF-SHE, 2008 WL 5217936 (D. Mont. Dec. 11, 2008); In re Goins, 372 B.R. 824, 827 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
2007). 
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uniformity. It seems that Congress erred in its decision to leave the 
development of a definite standard to the bankruptcy courts, as such a standard 
has not developed in the twenty-eight years since the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.204 
III.  CASE LAW—WHICH FACTORS MATTER MOST? 
Bankruptcy courts have looked to several different factors in confirming or 
denying a plan based on an objection to educational expenses being deducted 
from a debtor’s disposable income. While a mere preference for private 
schooling is not sufficient to meet the burden of proof for showing that such 
deductions are reasonably necessary,205 there are several other assertions 
debtors can make that may increase their chances of being allowed to deduct 
tuition costs from disposable income. 
The following subparts discuss the factors used in bankruptcy cases where 
tuition expenses are in dispute. Courts have considered the following factors: 
(1) length of attendance; (2) religious convictions; (3) cost of tuition; (4) 
percentage of repayment to creditors; (5) debtor sacrifices; (6) availability and 
quality of public schools; and (7) special needs of the debtor or a dependent of 
the debtor. In applying these factors, courts have given insight into the types of 
circumstances that comprise a reasonably necessary tuition expense and those 
that do not. 
A. Length of Attendance 
The length of time a debtor or a debtor’s dependent has attended a private 
educational institution has factored in courts’ assessments of whether tuition 
expenses can be deducted from disposable income contributed to a chapter 13 
plan. Generally, if a debtor or a debtor’s dependent has attended private school 
for a short period of time, courts are less likely to confirm the plan. For 
example, in Univest-Coppell Village, Ltd. v. Nelson, a creditor objected to the 
debtors’ deduction of $395 per month for private high school tuition for the 
debtors’ daughter, who was in her first year at the school.206 The debtors and 
 
 204 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[T]he allowance of private school 
tuition as a reasonable and necessary expense is not settled law . . . .”). 
 205 See, e.g., Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 660–61 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), aff’d, 403 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996); In re Jones, 
55 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). 
 206 Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd., 204 B.R. at 497. 
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their daughter were adamant about not switching to public school, in part 
because the daughter was the first freshman to make the cheerleading squad.207 
Nonetheless, the court found that the debtors’ tuition expense was not 
reasonably necessary and that the daughter could attend the same public high 
school that her older sister attended.208 
On the other hand, the fact that a debtor or dependent has attended the 
school in question for a long period of time increases the likelihood that a court 
will find the tuition expenses to be reasonably necessary.209 This factor played 
a part in the court’s decision in In re Nicola.210 There, the court upheld the 
debtors’ deduction of $260 per month for their daughter’s Catholic school 
tuition against the trustee’s objection211 because the debtor’s situation was 
“more like those of the cases where courts found tuition payments to be 
reasonably necessary.”212 The court based its decision on the following facts: 
the tuition amount was less than amounts that were not considered reasonably 
necessary in past cases; the local public school was inadequate based on low 
standardized test scores; the debtors were devout Catholics; and their daughter 
had “attended Catholic school her entire life.”213 
As is the case with most of the factors discussed in this section, length of 
attendance alone is not dispositive. As the Nicola court noted, “[a]ny of the 
[the case’s] facts alone may not be enough to warrant a finding that the tuition 
expense is reasonably necessary.”214 In fact, no court has found a debtor’s 
educational expenses to be reasonably necessary solely on the basis of length 
of attendance. Courts need additional evidence to deem tuition costs an 
allowable expense.215 
B. Religious Convictions 
Bankruptcy courts are split on the issue of whether a debtor’s religious 
convictions are dispositive in deciding whether tuition costs are reasonably 
 
 207 Id. at 497–98. 
 208 Id. at 500. 
 209 See, e.g., In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 798. 
 213 Id. at 799. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See, e.g., id. (noting not only that the debtor’s child had attended Catholic school her whole life, but 
also that the tuition amount was not excessive and that the available public schooling was of low quality). 
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necessary.216 At least one court has concluded that religious education for a 
debtor or a debtor’s dependent is not per se unreasonable.217 Other courts assert 
that religious convictions alone, no matter how strong or sincere, are not 
sufficient to meet the debtor’s burden of showing that tuition expenses are 
reasonably necessary.218 It is almost always the case that debtors asserting a 
religious conviction have set forth additional compelling factors.219 
In the case of In re Navarro, the court was hesitant to infringe on the 
debtors’ religious beliefs. 220 There, the court held that the debtors’ $100 
monthly expense to send their child to parochial school was reasonably 
necessary.221 The court partially based its decision on the fact that the debtors 
had made lifestyle sacrifices to send their child to parochial school.222 The 
court also found that religious education is not a per se unreasonable choice for 
the maintenance and support of the debtor’s family.223 The court noted that 
because the debtors obtained no tangible benefit by paying this tuition, it was 
not a luxury good or service.224 The court admitted, however, that its ruling 
may have been different if the debtors were paying this tuition “as part of a 
conscious choice to presently favor their religious beliefs over unsecured 
creditors.”225 The issue of whether a debtor’s religious views should usurp 
unsecured creditors’ rights to be repaid is an ongoing discussion among courts 
on whether tuition expenses are reasonably necessary. 
The court’s reasoning in Watson is particularly compelling when 
addressing this issue.226 The debtors argued that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) protected their right “to use disposable income to 
pay for their children’s private religious school tuition.”227 RFRA restricts the 
 
 216 Compare id. (holding that a debtor’s religious convictions can be taken into consideration when 
deciding whether private school tuition is “reasonably necessary”), with Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 
309 B.R. 652, 661 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a preference for a religious education is not sufficient to 
render private school tuition reasonably necessary), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 217 See, e.g., In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 218 See, e.g., In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 661 (“Such a preference, while apparently sincere, is not sufficient 
to render the expense of private school tuition reasonably necessary.”). 
 219 See, e.g., In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 374 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Nicola, 244 B.R. at 799. 
 220 In re Navarro, 83 B.R. at 357. 
 221 Id. at 356. 
 222 See id. at 357. 
 223 Id. at 356. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 357. 
 226 See Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 663–64 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2005). 
 227 Id. at 663. 
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government’s ability to burden the free exercise of religion, unless that burden 
furthers a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive way 
possible.228 The Watson court noted that debtors carry the burden of proving 
that the court’s denial of their plan substantially burdened their right to practice 
their faith.229 
The Watson court looked to the Catechism of the Catholic Church to show 
that including the disputed tuition expense in disposable income did not 
substantially burden the debtors’ ability to practice their faith.230 The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church states that a parent’s responsibilities for 
religious practice and education take place primarily in the home.231 Thus, 
even when a debtor has sincere religious beliefs, an order to include private 
school tuition in the debtor’s disposable income does not substantially burden 
the debtor’s ability or right to practice religion.232 The Watson court concluded 
that such an order “does not interfere with [a debtor’s] ability to attend 
religious services, pray, worship or fulfill their religious duties.”233 
Clearly, the religious convictions of debtors play a role in bankruptcy 
decisions regarding tuition expense deductions.234 However, almost all cases 
on point have required more than an assertion of religious beliefs for a court to 
find a tuition deduction to be reasonably necessary.235 
C. Cost of Tuition 
The cost of the tuition in dispute is an important factor in a bankruptcy 
court’s decision of whether the debtor’s deduction is reasonably necessary. It 
may seem logical that courts dealing with above-median income debtors would 
use the statutorily prescribed annual tuition amount of $1,775 per child under 
 
 228 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006); In re Watson, 309 B.R. 
at 663 (noting that strict scrutiny is applied to federal laws that place a substantial burden on one’s free 
exercise of religion). 
 229 In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 663 (citing Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111, 122 
(D.N.H. 2003), aff’d, 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
 230 Id. at 663–64. 
 231 Id. at 664 (citing Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 See, e.g., In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 374 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 235 See, e.g., In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 664; In re Cleary, 357 B.R. at 373–74; In re Nicola, 244 B.R. at 
799. 
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the age of eighteen.236 Courts rarely cite this provision, however, and often 
approve amounts far exceeding the statutory limit.237 Regardless of whether the 
debtor is an above- or below-median income earner, bankruptcy courts are 
consistently concerned with the tuition amount in the context of the 
circumstances surrounding the case.238 
Generally, relatively high tuition costs are less likely to be considered 
reasonably necessary because higher tuition costs take more disposable income 
away from unsecured creditors.239 In In re Ehret, the court found that a $2,000 
monthly expense for the debtor’s child to attend private school was not 
reasonably necessary because “a debtor’s creditors should [not] pay tuition for 
the debtor’s children.”240 The court gave this ruling in spite of the debtors’ 
claims that their son needed special education not available in public 
schools.241 
Conversely, courts are more inclined to approve lower tuition cost 
deductions,242 especially in cases where a debtor has made a substantial effort 
to make up for the deduction by sacrificing some other necessary expense.243 
Recall that in Nicola, the court allowed a tuition expense in part because it was 
far less than the tuition deductions that other courts had rejected.244 Ultimately, 
the amount that a debtor deducts for educational expenses does not decide the 
case by itself and, like the other factors, is merely another piece of evidence for 
courts to consider in a case-by-case analysis. 
D. Percentage of Repayment to Creditors 
As noted earlier, one of chapter 13 bankruptcy’s main goals is to have the 
debtor repay as much debt as possible to creditors without jeopardizing the 
 
 236 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (West 2010). 
 237 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Urquhart, No. 09-71058, 
2009 WL 3785573, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2009); In re Cleary, 357 B.R. at 374. 
 238 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 872. 
 239 See, e.g., In re Ehret, 238 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (debtor claiming $2,000 per month for one 
dependent); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (debtor claiming $1,000 per month for two 
dependents). 
 240 In re Ehret, 238 B.R. at 87 (quoting In re McNulty, 142 B.R. 106, 110 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992)). 
 241 Id. 
 242 See, e.g., In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604, 611 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (debtors claiming $700 per 
month for two dependents); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 356–57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (debtors claiming 
$100 per month for one dependent). 
 243 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 872; In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 374 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006). 
 244 In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
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basic needs of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.245 Bankruptcy courts 
promote this goal by considering the percentage and amount of debts to be paid 
under a debtor’s proposed plan when assessing whether a tuition deduction is 
reasonably necessary. In cases where the debtor’s proposed plan provides for a 
small percentage of repayment, 246 or where the tuition deduction is relatively 
high in comparison to the repayment amount,247 a court is more likely to hold 
that such tuition expenses must be committed to the plan. 
In Watson, the court found that a tuition expense of $735 per month was 
not reasonably necessary in part because the plan proposed to repay only 25% 
of the unsecured debt.248 The court found that the debtor’s plan did not “reflect 
a good faith effort to repay creditors,”249 thereby violating § 1325(a)(3).250 The 
Boyd court reached a similar conclusion, noting that the “[d]ebtor’s proposed 
plan would only pay a fraction of the unsecured claims.”251 
Overall, the “good faith” analysis of Watson often plays a substantial part 
when a court considers the amount of repayment in the context of a tuition 
deduction.252 However, many courts have allowed tuition deductions even 
where a debtor is repaying a small percentage of the unsecured debt in the 
chapter 13 plan.253 This factor demonstrates the arbitrariness of how different 
courts decide this issue. 
E. Debtor Sacrifices 
The drafters of chapter 13 noted that the debtor and the debtor’s family 
might need to make sacrifices and lifestyle alterations to satisfy the legislative 
 
 245 See S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 22 (1983). 
 246 See, e.g., DeHart v. Boyd (In re Boyd), 378 B.R. 81, 84 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 247 See, e.g., Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 662 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), aff’d, 403 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 664. 
 250 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006). 
 251 In re Boyd, 378 B.R. at 84. 
 252 See, e.g., In re Riegodedios, 146 B.R. 691, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992). 
 253 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 869, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (allowing tuition expense of 
$500 per month where the modified plan reduced repayment to unsecured creditors from 100% to 30%); In re 
Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 373–74 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (allowing tuition expense of $1,513 per month where the 
plan provided 1% repayment to unsecured creditors); In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 687, 691 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
2001) (allowing tuition expense of $550 per month where the plan provided 1.008% repayment to unsecured 
creditors); In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 796, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (allowing tuition expense of $260 per 
month where the plan provided 10% repayment to unsecured creditors). 
CAPOTOSTO GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/16/2013 2:48 PM 
228 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
intent of maximum creditor repayment.254 Mindful of this intent, courts 
consider what sacrifices, if any, a debtor has made to offset the tuition amount 
being deducted from disposable income. The sacrifice factor is similar to the 
amount of repayment factor in that both factors are rooted in the good faith 
doctrine required by the Code255 and expressed in Watson.256  
If a debtor makes a substantial effort to cut the costs of other basic 
expenses to compensate for the educational expenses being deducted from 
disposable income, courts are more likely to consider the education deduction 
to be reasonably necessary.257 Conversely, courts might not allow a debtor to 
deduct educational expenses if the debtor does not put forth a “good faith effort 
to maximize repayment to creditors,” in addition to compensating for the 
deduction.258 For example, the Watson court found that the debtors did not 
demonstrate “an attempt to offset the private school tuition expense by 
eliminating or minimizing other reasonably necessary expenses.”259 This lack 
of effort weighed against the debtors in a similar fashion as the small 
percentage of repayment factor.260 
F. Availability and Quality of Public Schools 
Public schools in the United States do not all provide the same quality of 
education to students, and some debtors have elected to send their children to 
private school because they live in an area that does not offer a quality public 
education.261 Recognizing this lack of uniformity, courts will consider the 
availability and quality of public schools in a debtor’s surrounding area in 
deciding whether a debtor’s claim for school tuition is reasonably necessary.262 
Some commentators argue that expenses for sending a dependent to private 
school rather than public school should always be considered reasonably 
 
 254 See S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 22 (1983). 
 255 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). 
 256 See Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 660–61 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2005). 
 257 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 872; In re Cleary, 357 B.R. at 374. 
 258 In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 660–61. 
 259 Id. at 661–62. 
 260 Id. 
 261 See, e.g., In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 796–97 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 262 See, e.g., Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996); In re Nicola, 244 
B.R. at 799. 
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necessary,263 aligning their arguments with the unique position taken by the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York in In re Awuku.264 
While the Awuku court did not have to decide the issue of an educational 
expense deduction,265 it candidly used educational costs as an example in its 
general discussion of reasonably necessary expenses in chapter 13 cases.266 
The court wrote: 
Presumably any expenses incurred by a debtor to educate his or her 
children are justified on the need to equip those children with the 
fundamental skills that are “reasonably necessary” for future 
employment or, if it not completely passe, for leading an “examined 
life” or at least playing an active role as an informed citizen in a free 
and democratic society.267 
The court’s reasoning is flawed, however, because those “fundamental skills 
that are reasonably necessary for future employment” can easily be obtained at 
most public schools in the United States. If anything, public school attendees 
may even lead a more “examined life,” as they are removed from the shelters 
of private school and exposed to a more socioeconomically diverse range of 
peers.268 
Debtors who live in an area with adequate public schooling available will 
have a difficult time convincing a judge that their claims for private school 
tuition are reasonably necessary.269 Those debtors’ dependents could receive a 
suitable education for free, allowing for more money to be paid to creditors. 
This reasoning underpinned the court’s decision in Nelson.270 Recall that the 
dispute in Nelson centered on the debtors’ deduction of $395 per month for 
their daughter’s private high school tuition.271 The court found that this 
 
 263 See Richard Corbi, Note, You Have the Right to Cable TV, But Not Education: A Proposal to Amend 
the Bankruptcy Code to Permit All Education Expenses in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plans, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 
625, 626 (2005). 
 264 See In re Awuku, 248 B.R. 21, 29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 265 The issue in this case was whether a bi-weekly pension deduction of a debtor city employee was a 
reasonably necessary expense. See id. at 23. 
 266 See id. at 29. 
 267 Id. 
 268 See Rebecca D. Williams, Many Private Schools Score Higher but Have Less Diversity, KNOXVILLE 
NEWS SENTINEL (June 15, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/jun/15/many-private-
schools-score-highter-but-have/. 
 269 See, e.g., Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 661 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), aff’d, 403 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 2005); Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996); In re Weiss, 251 
B.R. 453, 462 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). 
 270 See Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd., 204 B.R. at 500. 
 271 Id. at 497. 
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expense was not reasonably necessary, despite the debtors’ concerns about 
transferring their daughter to public school.272 Noting first that “a private 
school education is not a basic need,” the court concluded that the debtors’ 
daughter could attend the local public high school that her sister attended.273 
A compelling circumstance may exist when courts find that the public 
schooling available to a debtor is inadequate and forcing a switch to public 
school will be overly burdensome. In Nicola, the debtors presented evidence 
that the local public school’s average standardized test scores were below the 
average test scores of the rest of the state.274 The court weighed this factor in 
favor of the education expense being reasonably necessary.275 However, the 
court did not consider the below average test scores alone to be the deciding 
factor, but rather looked at this factor along with others to reach its conclusion 
that the expenses were reasonably necessary.276 
Although the adequacy of public schooling has been addressed in 
bankruptcy proceedings on point,277 courts have not reached a consensus 
regarding the proper method by which to measure a public school’s adequacy. 
Developing or deciding on such a measuring system would help all parties 
involved in a chapter 13 tuition dispute. 
G. Special Needs of the Debtor or a Dependent of the Debtor 
Public schooling, while adequate for the great majority of children in the 
United States, does not always work for students who have learning disabilities 
or other special needs. If a debtor’s dependent has special needs and requires a 
unique learning environment, the tuition expense for that dependent has been 
found reasonably necessary in most cases.278 However, the debtor will usually 
need to present evidence, such as testimony from a psychologist279 or proof 
that public school simply is not an option,280 for the court to allow the expense 
to be deducted from disposable income. In general, if a debtor can provide this 
 
 272 Id. at 498, 500. The court also noted that the father did not have any particular problem with the 
education offered at the local public school. Id. at 500. 
 273 Id. at 500. 
 274 In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 275 Id. 
 276 See id. (noting also that the amount being claimed was low in comparison to other cases). 
 277 See, e.g., Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd., 204 B.R. at 500; In re Nicola, 244 B.R. at 799. 
 278 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 870, 872 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 
690–91 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001). 
 279 See, e.g., In re Webb, 262 B.R. at 690–91. 
 280 See, e.g., In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 872 & n.3. 
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proof, courts will be more lenient in finding such educational expenses to be 
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor’s dependent. 
The Ehret decision sheds some light on how courts consider the special 
needs factor in tuition deduction disputes. In Ehret, the trustee and unsecured 
creditors objected to the debtor’s expense claim of $2,000 per month for a 
dependent son’s tuition expenses.281 The debtor and his wife asserted that their 
son needed special education that was unavailable in public schools.282 
However, the debtor presented no evidence, expert testimony or documentation 
as to the existence or nature of his son’s disability.283 Consequently, the court 
held that the tuition was not reasonably necessary.284 
The Ehret court provided an additional point of analysis not seen in other 
cases involving special needs dependents. The opinion stated that if the 
debtor’s son is truly disabled, then the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (“IDEA”), which requires states to provide disabled students with “free 
appropriate public education,” applies.285 If public schooling cannot meet a 
certain child’s needs, IDEA mandates that the student’s district school board 
pay for an appropriate private school placement.286 The fact that the debtor 
failed to demonstrate how IDEA did not satisfy his son’s educational needs at 
no cost was a factor in the court’s decision to reject the debtor’s plan.287 This 
part of the court’s analysis is quite novel because it provides an alternative 
statute that can be used to provide funding for a special needs student without a 
corresponding deduction in the debtor’s disposable income. 
In re Webb provides an example of a dependent’s special needs weighing in 
favor of a reasonably necessary tuition expense.288 In Webb, the trustee 
objected to the deduction of a monthly private school tuition expense of $550 
for the debtors’ son.289 The debtors offered the expert testimony of a licensed 
physician and child psychiatrist, who testified that the debtors’ son suffered 
from attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, general anxiety disorder, and an 
obsessive-compulsive mood disorder.290 The expert also testified that 
 
 281 In re Ehret, 238 B.R. 85, 86 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999). 
 282 Id. at 87. 
 283 Id. at 88. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). 
 286 Id. (citing Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 287 Id. 
 288 See generally In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001). 
 289 Id. at 687. 
 290 Id. at 688. 
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integrating the dependent into a public school environment would significantly 
impede the dependent’s academic progress.291 The debtors corroborated the 
doctor’s opinion by providing details of difficulties in their previous attempts 
to place their son in public school.292 
In deciding whether the tuition costs were reasonably necessary, the Webb 
court initially expressed the general rule that, “[i]n the absence of some 
compelling circumstance . . . a private school education is not reasonably 
necessary.”293 However, the court found that the evidence presented a 
compelling circumstance: there were significant doubts as to whether the 
child’s specific needs could be properly addressed at the available public 
school.294 
The Ehret and Webb decisions demonstrate that debtors need to present 
compelling evidence to show that their dependents’ tuition costs are reasonably 
necessary based on their special learning needs. The problem is that there are 
no guidelines—save for inconsistent case law—for courts and debtors to 
determine what circumstances rise to this compelling level. Changes are 
needed at both the statutory and judicial levels to provide concrete standards 
for what constitutes a reasonably necessary educational expense. Otherwise, 
judicial discretion will continue to create arbitrary and inconsistent decisions 
regarding tuition deductions in chapter 13 cases. 
IV.  THE SOLUTION—A NEW REASONABLY NECESSARY STANDARD 
A thorough examination of the case law yields many factors that courts 
consider when deciding the issue of whether private school tuition is 
reasonably necessary. Judges may consider any or all of these factors, making 
the decision difficult to predict in each case. Furthermore, the lack of a more 
precise standard of evaluation conflicts with Congress’s intent.295 In the 
legislative history concerning the relevant Code sections, Congress 
consistently voiced its displeasure with the vague and ambiguous nature of the 
statutes.296 The Code’s lack of clarity has led to judicial splits on the issue of 
 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. at 690. 
 294 Id. The Webb court also differentiated its case from Ehret, in that the debtors in Webb provided 
documentation and an explanation of the existence and nature of the dependent’s disability, while the debtor in 
Ehret did not. Compare id., with In re Ehret, 238 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999). 
 295 See S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 21 (1983). 
 296 Id. 
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reasonably necessary expenses297 and has given bankruptcy judges an 
enormous amount of discretion in such matters.298 
Congress took a step in the right direction with the enactment of BAPCPA 
by defining acceptable monthly expenses for above-median income chapter 13 
debtors. Specifically, BAPCPA implemented the referral to the IRS 
Standards,299 which are based on annual surveys and census data.300 Congress 
essentially wrote a statutory standard for deductions of items like food, 
clothing, healthcare, and personal care that can be adjusted without new 
legislation by using the amounts provided by the IRS and other government 
sources.301 Despite the addition of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), Congress has yet to 
provide concrete standards for reasonably necessary educational expenses.302 
In addition, the IRS standards do not apply to below-median income chapter 13 
debtors, who are still subject to the vague language of § 1325(b).303 
Courts generally agree that a debtor’s preference for private schooling, in 
the absence of compelling circumstances, does not meet the reasonably 
necessary threshold.304 The issue, however, is that these compelling 
circumstances vary widely across jurisdictions, and courts have yet to unite on 
a single, workable test for whether a debtor’s claimed tuition expenses are 
reasonably necessary.305 This lack of a definitive standard has forced courts to 
answer “difficult questions of lifestyle and philosophy”306 in determining a 
debtor’s needs to deduct tuition expenses for the maintenance or support of the 
debtor and his family. 
 
 297 See In re Johnson, 241 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that because there is no precise 
standard for what expenses are reasonably necessary, courts have scrutinized these expenses in many different 
ways); see also S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 21–22. 
 298 See Corbi, supra note 263, at 626; see also Justin Harelik, Bankruptcy May Block Kids’ Private 
School, BANKRATE.COM (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/debt/bankruptcy-may-block-kids-
private-school.aspx; Stephen Trezza, Private School Tuition in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, NAT’L BANKR. F. 
(June 16, 2011), http://www.nationalbankruptcyforum.com/bankruptcy-myths/private-school-tuition-in-
chapter-13-bankruptcy/. 
 299 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 102(a)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 23, 27–28 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006)). 
 300 See IRM 5.15.1.7 (Oct. 2, 2009). 
 301 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 302 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[T]he allowance of private school 
tuition as a reasonable and necessary expense is not settled law . . . .”). 
 303 See NORTON, supra note 4, § 151:22. 
 304 See, e.g., In re Cleary, 357 B.R. 369, 374 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 690–91 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001); In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 305 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. at 871 (“[T]he allowance of private school tuition as a reasonable and 
necessary expense is not settled law . . . .”). 
 306 See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 4, § 151:22. 
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Congress has given the bankruptcy courts a substantial amount of time to 
develop a standard of judicial interpretation of the legislation. It is time for the 
legislature to use the factors and decisions formulated by the courts to create a 
standard of its own concerning what constitutes a reasonably necessary tuition 
expense. While commentators seem to agree that the law concerning the 
deduction of these expenses is vague and inconsistently applied across 
jurisdictions,307 they disagree as to how the Code should be amended to root 
out the ambiguity and broad judicial discretion relating to these expenses. 
Some critics have taken the extreme stance that all educational expenses 
should be allowed to be deducted from a chapter 13 debtor’s disposable 
income, regardless of the tuition amount or the circumstances surrounding the 
deduction.308 The better stance aligns itself more closely to the purpose of 
chapter 13, which is “to provide the maximum recovery to creditors while at 
the same time leaving the debtor sufficient money to pay for his or her basic 
living expenses.”309 This approach also recognizes that a debtor’s creditors 
should not have to pay for the tuition of the debtor or the debtor’s children.310 
Several changes can be made, both at the statutory and judicial level, to 
create a uniform standard for courts to use when assessing whether tuition 
deductions are reasonably necessary. In the following subparts, this Comment 
proposes certain suggestions that will result in a comprehensive, structured and 
workable standard that all parties involved could look to in considering the 
deduction of educational expenses from a debtor’s disposable income in a 
chapter 13 plan. 
First, this Comment proposes that certain superfluous and preferential 
factors be eliminated from consideration. Next, this Comment defines a two-
prong test derived from the totality of the circumstances test set forth in 
Watson. The first prong is a threshold prong, setting a ceiling for maximum 
tuition deductions and a floor for minimum repayment to creditors. The second 
prong requires the existence of a specific compelling circumstance in addition 
to the threshold requirements of the first prong. These changes attempt to 
comply with Congress’s intent while also protecting the interests of both 
debtors and creditors. 
 
 307 See, e.g., Corbi, supra note 263, at 626; Harelik, supra note 298; Trezza, supra note 298. 
 308 Corbi, supra note 263, at 630. 
 309 In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (emphases added). 
 310 See, e.g., In re McNulty, 142 B.R. 106, 110 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992). 
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A. Eliminating Preferences 
Certain factors that have been considered in past bankruptcy proceedings 
should be disregarded in future cases, as these factors reveal little about the 
reasonableness or necessity of the tuition costs to the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents. A mere preference for private school is not enough for debtors to 
meet their burden of proof311 because such a preference has no bearing on 
whether a tuition expense is reasonably necessary for the maintenance or 
support of the debtor and the debtor’s family. The same reasoning suggests that 
religious beliefs and length of attendance at private school should likewise not 
factor into a court’s decision because these factors do not make a tuition cost 
any more reasonably necessary. 
Religious convictions, no matter how strong, should be treated as a 
preference for private schooling and should not factor into the decision of 
whether the tuition payments are reasonably necessary. While freedom of 
religion is a deeply rooted right in this country,312 a preference for private 
schools based on a debtor’s religious choice should not preempt the repayment 
of debt to creditors. 
The framers of chapter 13 were careful to include certain provisions to 
ensure that bankruptcy would account for a debtor’s right to practice religion. 
For example, § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) allows for the deduction of charitable 
contributions to qualified religious entities of up to 15% of the debtor’s gross 
income.313 However, these accommodations do not extend so far as to justify a 
debtor withholding money from creditors for tuition expenses. As the Watson 
court properly noted, denying a tuition deduction based on religious 
convictions does not substantially burden the debtor’s right to practice his or 
her religion.314 The court reasoned that its denial did not place “a substantial 
burden on the observation of a central belief or practice”315 because 
“[e]ducation at a parochial school is not such a [central] belief.”316 Although 
 
 311 See, e.g., Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 309 B.R. 652, 661 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004) (citing Univest-
Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 500 (E.D. Tex. 1996)), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); In re 
Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 690–91 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001)). 
 312 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 313 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 314 In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 663–64. 
 315 Id. at 663 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). 
 316 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d. 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999)). It is worth 
pointing out that Catholicism was the religion being analyzed in Watson, so further inquiry would be necessary 
to determine if a parochial education outside the home is required by other religions. 
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Congress has recognized tithing as a central practice to many religions, 
evidenced by the inclusion of § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii), it has not found parochial 
education outside of the home to be a “central belief” to religion under this 
framework. 
Furthermore, there is no palpable way to measure the devotion of a debtor 
and his or her family to their religion, allowing once again for wide judicial 
discretion when religious beliefs are proposed as a reason why a tuition 
deduction is reasonably necessary. Because disallowing parochial tuition 
expenses does not significantly burden a debtor’s ability to practice his or her 
religion,317 and because there is too much judicial leeway in weighing this 
factor, a debtor’s religious convictions should be excluded from a court’s 
analysis. 
While some bankruptcy courts have taken into account the length of time a 
debtor’s dependent has attended private school,318 length of attendance should 
not have any relevance in determining whether the tuition expenses are 
reasonably necessary. Logically, attending a private school for a longer period 
of time does not make the cost for such a school any more reasonably 
necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor and the debtor’s family. 
It is easy to understand why debtors and their dependents would prefer to stay 
at a school that they have attended for an extended period of time. People 
naturally foster relationships with peers and develop a comfort zone the longer 
they attend an institution. What this issue amounts to, however, is a mere 
preference for a private school education based on feelings and convenience. It 
is settled law that the mere preference for private school is insufficient to 
overcome a creditor’s right to be repaid and does not affect the maintenance or 
support of a debtor’s family.319 Therefore, the length of attendance should not 
factor into a bankruptcy court’s decision as to whether the deduction of an 
educational expense is reasonably necessary. 
B. First Prong—Setting a Threshold for Educational Expense Deductions 
Receiving a private school education is not a basic right of a debtor or a 
debtor’s dependents320 and has been considered a luxury or discretionary 
 
 317 See, e.g., id. at 663–64. 
 318 See, e.g., In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 319 See, e.g., In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 661; Univest-Coppell Vill., Ltd. v. Nelson, 204 B.R. 497, 497–98, 
500 (E.D. Tex. 1996); In re Jones, 55 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). 
 320 See, e.g., In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 467. 
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expense by many bankruptcy courts.321 Although the tuition amount being 
deducted is always mentioned in cases involving an educational expense 
dispute, the weight courts give this factor varies widely across jurisdictions. 
Additionally, Congress’s attempt to cap tuition deductions for above-median 
debtors has failed because § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) only allows for a tuition 
amount that is inadequate for almost any private school in the United States322 
and qualifies that amount by requiring the debtor to prove that the deduction is 
reasonable and necessary.323 Congress should have imposed a more realistic 
cap on tuition amounts and applied that cap to all chapter 13 debtors, 
regardless of income. 
The legislature should provide debtors and the courts with an adjustable 
standard, as it does with the IRS Standards applied to above-median income 
chapter 13 debtors. One suggestion would be to use the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ average tuition costs, which come out every three years 
and are divided by elementary and secondary education.324 For this proposed 
cap to adhere to the overarching principle of not allowing bankrupt debtors to 
retain their former, unsustainable way of life,325 the cap should be set, at a 
maximum, to the average tuition cost of private school. However, Congress 
could more properly set the cap at a point below the average because, as courts 
and creditors have argued, private schooling is not a basic right of citizenship 
in this country.326 This cap would serve as the maximum educational expense 
deduction. 
In conjunction with the tuition cap, the legislature should set a minimum 
percentage of repayment for chapter 13 debtors wishing to deduct tuition 
expenses from their disposable income. This minimum repayment floor would 
serve a screening purpose, similar to the hard cap on the amount of tuition that 
 
 321 See, e.g., In re Watson, 309 B.R. at 661–62; In re MacDonald, 222 B.R. 69, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); 
In re Jones, 55 B.R. at 467. 
 322 See 151 CONG. REC. S2224 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd); see also Private 
Elementary and Secondary Enrollment, Number of Schools, and Average Tuition, by School Level, 
Orientation, and Tuition: 1999–2000, 2003–04, and 2007–08, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed. 
gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_063.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
 323 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006). 
 324 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., supra note 322, for an example of the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ average tuition costs chart. 
 325 See Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 22 
(1983). 
 326 See, e.g., James Rodenberg, Comment, Reasonably Necessary Expenses or Life of Riley?: The 
Disposable Income Test and a Chapter 13 Debtor’s Lifestyle, 56 MO. L. REV. 617, 653–54 (1991) (citing In re 
Jones, 55 B.R. at 467). 
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a debtor can claim. Imposing this restriction would be a further manifestation 
of the good faith doctrine, which heeds closely to Congress’s intent concerning 
chapter 13.327 
An adequate repayment amount should reasonably satisfy the chapter 13 
good faith requirement.328 Some bankruptcy courts have already developed 
guidelines for minimum repayment requirements to meet this good faith 
standard for plan confirmation.329 Examining the methods of those courts 
together with statistics showing the average repayment percentage of chapter 
13 debtors should yield a workable minimum percentage that debtors must 
repay to become eligible for an educational tuition expense deduction from 
disposable income. 
As it currently stands, bankruptcy courts must use one of two different 
Code sections, § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) or § 1325(b)(2)(A), when analyzing 
educational expense deductions. Applying these new suggested barriers to all 
debtors would provide the courts with concrete and workable guidelines and 
would lead to more consistent judgments across the board concerning tuition 
deductions from disposable income. 
C. Second Prong—Compelling Circumstances 
Once a debtor passes the initial threshold requirements expressed above, 
that debtor should then be required to show a compelling circumstance for the 
claimed tuition expense to be reasonably necessary. After examining the case 
law, only three of the factors examined in Part III of this Comment provide 
compelling proof that a tuition expense is reasonably necessary: (1) the 
inadequacy of available public schooling; (2) the special needs of a debtor or a 
debtor’s dependent; and (3) special sacrifices made by the debtor’s family. If 
one of these three factors is present in addition to the two threshold barriers, a 
court should allow the tuition expense deduction as reasonably necessary. 
To show a compelling circumstance based on the inadequacy of public 
schooling, debtors should be required to show that the public schools in their 
area do not meet specific adjustable guidelines, which are similar to the IRS 
Standards. In choosing proper guidelines, Congress should not use average 
 
 327 See S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 21. 
 328 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). 
 329 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 267 (1997), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/08consum.pdf. 
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standardized test scores as the baseline as the court in Nicola did.330 The reason 
is that not all schoolchildren, even those whose families pay their bills and are 
not bankrupt, are able to attend “average” public schools. Additionally, 
standardized test scores do not always mirror the quality of the education 
available at a public school.331 
A better procedure would be to use the list of schools that do not meet the 
adequate yearly progress (“AYP”) requirements332 of the No Child Left Behind 
Act (“NCLB”) to determine whether the quality of the public school in 
question is adequate.333 According to the provisions of NCLB, states must 
identify schools that do not meet the AYP requirements for two consecutive 
years.334 If the public school in the debtor’s school district is identified as one 
of the schools needing improvement, then the debtor should be able to claim 
this as a compelling circumstance. 
Another compelling circumstance to justify a tuition deduction as 
reasonably necessary may exist if a dependent of the debtor has special 
learning needs. Many children have unique learning needs, and debtors with 
such children should have the opportunity to demonstrate that their child 
requires a special learning environment. While public schooling is sufficient 
for the vast majority of students, it would be fundamentally wrong to deprive a 
student with legitimate special needs from his or her right to learn, and these 
students may require alternative schooling to meet their needs. 
The proposed modification would require the debtor to provide specific 
proof that a compelling circumstance exists. If a child has a learning disability 
or a health condition that affects his or her ability to learn, bankruptcy courts 
should require proof of such claims through the expert testimony of a certified 
psychiatrist, physician, or psychologist. This modification would allow the 
court to rely on the experience and observations of an expert, rather than on the 
court’s ability to discern the child’s needs. If the debtor demonstrates a 
compelling need through such testimony and the debtor meets the threshold 
 
 330 See In re Nicola, 244 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 331 See W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don’t Measure Educational Quality, 56 EDUC. 
LEADERSHIP, Mar. 1999, at 8, 10. 
 332 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2006). 
 333 See generally Letter from Rod Paige, Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleague (July 24, 
2002), available at http://www2.ed.gov/print/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/020724.html. 
 334 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A) (“[A] local educational agency shall identify for school improvement any 
elementary school or secondary school served under this part that fails, for 2 consecutive years, to make 
adequate yearly progress . . . .”). 
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requirements,335 then a court should find the tuition expense claim to be 
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor and his or 
her family. 
The interaction between the tuition hard cap and the special needs 
compelling circumstance is important to address because special needs 
education is often quite costly.336 However, as noted in Ehret, funding for 
special education students is protected by IDEA.337 Courts have interpreted 
IDEA to require local school districts to reimburse the costs of placing a 
special needs student in a private school if the student’s needs are not being 
met at a public school.338 Therefore, if a debtor can show a special needs 
compelling circumstance and the public school is not providing an appropriate 
education, a court should grant a deduction of the cap amount and order the 
local school district to pay the remainder of the private school costs. This 
remedy would comply with IDEA’s mandate that a “free and appropriate 
education” be available to all special needs students.339 This would then relieve 
the debtor of any tuition expense, rendering the dispute regarding the 
reasonable necessity of the tuition deduction a moot point. Alternatively, as 
pointed out by the court in Crim, the difference could be covered by 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), which allows for reasonable and necessary expenses for 
the care and support of a chronically ill dependent.340 
The financial sacrifices a debtor makes to continue payment of tuition 
expenses should be considered a compelling circumstance if the debtor makes 
the sacrifices in good faith. If a debtor believes that an education expense is 
more important than another reasonably necessary expense, such as personal 
care products or cell phone expenses,341 the courts should not prohibit that 
 
 335 See supra Part IV.B. 
 336 See Matt Carroll, Costly Schooling, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 7, 2010) http://www.boston.com/news/ 
education/k_12/articles/2010/01/07/special_education_costs_soaring_in_area_school_districts/?page=1 
(noting that special education costs have grown at double the rate of regular school budgets in the Boston 
area). 
 337 See In re Ehret, 238 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). 
 338 See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9–10 (1993); Sch. Comm. of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 
F.3d 238, 247–49 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Obligation of Public 
Educational Agencies, Under Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C.A §§ 1400 et seq.), to Pay 
Tuition Costs for Students Unilaterally Placed in Private Schools—Post-Burlington Cases, 152 A.L.R. FED. 
485 § 3[c] (1999). 
 339 See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four, 510 U.S. at 9. 
 340 See In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868, 871 n.1 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011). 
 341 See IRM 5.15.1.9(1) (Oct. 2, 2009). 
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debtor from sacrificing those deductions for the tuition expense. Therefore, a 
definitive standard should also be created for sacrifices made by debtors 
wishing to deduct educational expenses. 
The IRS Standards, which should be applied to all chapter 13 debtors, 
explicitly list many of the expenses that are considered reasonably 
necessary,342 while the applicable Code sections list others.343 If a debtor wants 
to claim that a tuition cost is reasonably necessary for the maintenance or 
support of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents on the basis that other 
sacrifices are being made, the debtor should be required to show that other 
statutorily acceptable expenses, equaling or exceeding the tuition deduction, 
are being included in the disposable income in place of the tuition deduction. 
CONCLUSION 
The law concerning chapter 13 tuition expense deductions is plagued with 
inconsistency and lacks sufficiently defined standards of evaluation for courts 
to follow. The vague guidelines provided by the Code have created a system in 
which bankruptcy judges can arbitrarily decide whether tuition expenses are 
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor and the 
debtor’s dependents. The current system makes it difficult for debtors and 
objecting creditors to predict whether a tuition deduction will be upheld or 
shifted to the debtor’s disposable income to be paid to the creditors. 
Congress clearly intended for definite standards to be created concerning 
the amount of disposable income to be committed to a chapter 13 plan. 
Although Congress provided adequate standards for other deductions, it failed 
to provide a definite standard for what constitutes a reasonably necessary 
education deduction. The only standards at present are ad hoc tests developed 
by the bankruptcy courts. The fact that a majority of courts have yet to agree 
on a test for determining whether an education deduction is reasonably 
necessary is proof that this is a difficult issue to resolve. However, creating the 
definite standards that Congress envisioned is still possible. 
Having observed the diverging and unpredictable results caused by the 
current system over the past three decades, lawmakers must finally reform the 
Code as it pertains to chapter 13 tuition deductions. Private school education is 
not a basic right; debtors wishing to avail themselves of the benefits of chapter 
 
 342 See generally id. at 5.15.1.7.–10. 
 343 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1325(b)(2) (2006).  
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13 bankruptcy should still be required make sacrifices and lifestyle changes as 
part of a good faith effort to repay creditors. 
First, for a debtor to deduct any educational expenses from disposable 
income, the deduction should be capped at a defined and adjustable amount, 
and the good faith plan should provide for a minimum percentage of debt 
repayment. Second, in addition to these boundaries, a debtor should be 
required to demonstrate that a compelling circumstance exists which makes the 
tuition deduction reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the 
debtor and the debtor’s dependents. A mere preference for attending private 
school—whether such preference is based on religious convictions, length of 
attendance, or otherwise—should not be considered in establishing a 
compelling circumstance. Rather, the debtor should have to prove that the 
public schools in the debtor’s area are not meeting the AYP requirements of 
NCLB, that the debtor or dependent has documented special learning needs 
that require a unique school environment, or that the debtor has sacrificed other 
recognized necessary expenses to show that a compelling circumstance exists. 
The new approach that this Comment proposes would provide courts, debtors, 
and creditors with a definite set of rules on which to base their decisions, 
claims, and objections concerning whether a tuition deduction from disposable 
income is reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the chapter 
13 debtor or the debtor’s dependents. 
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